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We conduct a numerical analysis of bundling's impact on a monopolist's pricing and
product choices and assess the implications for consumer welfare in cable television
markets. Existing theory is ambiguous: for a given set of products, bundling likely
transfers surplus from consumers to ¯rms but also encourages products to be o®ered
that might not be under µ a la carte pricing. Simulation of \Full µ A La Carte" for an
economic environment calibrated to an average cable television system suggests that
consumers would likely bene¯t from µ a la carte sales. If all networks continued to be
o®ered, the average household's surplus is predicted to increase by $6.80 (65.6%) under
µ a la carte sales (despite a total bundle price that almost doubles) and reduced network
pro¯ts would have to be such that 41 of 50 o®ered cable networks have to exit the
market to make her indi®erent. Simulation of a \Theme Tier" scenario provides inter-
mediate bene¯ts. The incremental marginal costs to cable systems of µ a la carte sales
and its impact in the advertising market and on competition are important factors in
determining consumer bene¯ts. (JEL L12, L82, L50).
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11 Introduction
Bundling is a common feature in many imperfectly competitive product markets. Firms in the
telecommunications, ¯nancial services, health care, and information industries frequently o®er prod-
ucts in bundles. While often innocuous, recent research has identi¯ed settings in which bundling
can be used by ¯rms to price discriminate among consumers or to extend market power into related
product markets (Adams and Yellen (1976), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), Nalebu® (2004)).
We conduct a numerical analysis of bundling's impact on the prices and networks o®ered by a
\typical" U.S. cable television system and assess the consequences of these choices for consumer,
producer, and total welfare. We do so to speak to the current public policy debate about bundling
in cable markets. Motivated by consumer dis-satisfaction over ever-increasing cable prices, law- and
policy-makers are looking at unbundling { or \µ a la carte" pricing - as a possible policy solution.1
Most cable television systems and the networks provided on them are strongly opposed to the
idea, in part claiming that doing so would (possibly dramatically) reduce the number of (especially
smaller) networks that can survive in an µ a la carte environment (Booz Allen Hamilton (2004)).2
Existing theory bears out both of these views. On bundling and pricing, a substantial theoretical
literature suggests that bundling may be used to sort consumers in a manner similar to 2nd-degree
price discrimination (Stigler (1968), Adams and Yellen (1976), McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston
(1989), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), Armstrong (1999)). When consumers have heterogeneous
tastes for several products, bundling reduces that heterogeneity, allowing the ¯rm to earn greater
pro¯t than would be possible with component (unbundled) prices. While ¯rms clearly bene¯t in this
case, consumer welfare generally falls, particularly when bundling requires consumers to purchase
products in which they have little interest.
Less well established are the implications of bundling on the products o®ered by ¯rms. It is
well known that a single-product monopolist will not o®er some products that increase social
welfare because of the non-appropriability of total surplus (e.g. Tirole (1988, Chap. 2)). A key
factor in the extent of the distortion is the shape of consumer preferences; all else equal, products
with more elastic demand are more likely to be o®ered as the monopolist can better appropriate
surplus for such goods. In the multi-product case, theory is ambiguous: under-provision due to
non-appropriability is still a problem, but if products are substitutes, monopoly pricing on one
good may increase demand for a second enough to encourage its (ine±cient) o®ering. In this
(multi-product) case, bundling can also in°uence the calculus of product choice. Because bundling
1In addition to numerous articles in the popular press (e.g. Reuters (2003), Squeo and Flint (2004), Shatz (2006)),
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has published two reports analyzing µ a la carte pricing (FCC (2004),
FCC (2006)).
2The National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA) has a useful webpage summarizing industry
perspectives at http://www.ncta.com/IssueBrief.aspx?contentId=15.
2aggregates preferences for bundle components, it makes tastes more homogenous, increasing the
elasticity of demand (Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), Crawford (2006)). If marginal costs for bundle
components are zero, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) show that as bundle size increases without
bound, the product choice problem is solved; bundle pro¯t converges to total surplus and both the
monopolist and social planner will o®er the same portfolio of goods.
When marginal costs are not zero, however, bundling can work too well. Because bundling requires
all consumers purchase all goods, some sales may arise to consumers that value components at less
then their cost. This is particularly problematic when there is strong negative correlation in tastes.
Bundling is especially pro¯table in such settings (Adams and Yellen (1976), Schmalensee (1984))
and the pro¯t gains from correlation may outweigh the pro¯t losses from below-cost sales. If so, the
bundling monopolist may o®er products that actually reduce total welfare. Even if not, consumer
welfare may be lower from bundling; while some consumers will bene¯t from a new product, these
gains may be outweighed by losses to existing consumers of the bundle.3
What are the implications of these results for the µ a la carte debate in cable markets? The ¯rst
branch of the literature strongly suggests that, for a given set of networks, bundling reduces con-
sumer welfare to the bene¯t of ¯rms. The second branch, however, suggests that by providing
stronger incentives to o®er new products, bundling may increase consumer (and total) welfare.
The natural solution is to attempt to address this question empirically, a topic of related work in
progress (Crawford and Yurukoglu (2007)). In this paper, we take a numerical approach. We make
assumptions about households' willingness-to-pay (WTP) and ¯rms' costs for television networks.
We then calibrate these assumptions to replicate the o®erings of an \average" 2004 cable system
(California Cable of Monterey, California) and simulate the pro¯t and welfare consequences of alter-
native µ a la carte policy proposals. We do not consider the impact of µ a la carte on competition and
the advertising market (two important caveats), but we do consider the consequence of increased
marginal costs to cable systems of µ a la carte o®erings.
Several interesting results emerge from our numerical simulations. We consider two µ a la carte
scenarios: "Full µ A La Carte" and "Theme Tiers". As expected, if all networks continue to be
o®ered, consumers gain and ¯rms lose from full µ a la carte: average per-household consumers surplus
is estimated to increase by $6.80 (a 65.6% increase), gross ¯rm pro¯t is estimated to fall by $9.08
(a 44.2% decrease), and gross total surplus is estimated to fall by $2.28 (a 7.4% decrease). These
3In addition to the general literature cited here, there is a sizable literature analyzing the programs o®ered by ¯rms
in media (esp. radio and television) markets. Dating to Steiner (1954), this literature has focused on the consequences
of competition (versus monopoly) and advertiser (versus pay) support on the number and type of programs o®ered
by ¯rms and their consequence to consumer, advertiser, and total welfare (cf. Owen and Wildman (1992), Doyle
(1998), Berry and Waldfogel (1999), and Anderson and Coate (2005)). The contribution of this paper is to focus
on the case most relevant to cable television { pay-supported multi-product monopoly { and analyze the impact of
bundling on ¯rms' choices. Extending the analysis here to consider the impact of competition with satellite systems
and the advertising market would be valuable contributions. We discuss the likely consequences of these omissions
in Section 3.
3impacts almost surely outweigh any compensating bene¯t of µ a la carte to enhance incentives to o®er
networks: we estimate that 41 of the 50 o®ered cable networks in Monterey would have to exit for
consumers surplus under Full µ A La Carte to be no higher than that under bundling. Theme tiers
o®er similar, though smaller, e®ects (a 14.2% increase in consumers surplus, a 15.7% decrease in
pro¯t, a 5.7% decrease in total surplus, and 24 networks needed to exit to equate consumer bene¯ts).
These results suggest consumers might well bene¯t from µ a la carte sales of cable networks.
2 The Welfare E®ects of Bundling
In this section we illustrate the welfare e®ects of bundling by a multi-product monopolist. In the
¯rst subsection, we illustrate the discriminatory e®ects of bundling for a given set of products. In
the second, we extend this result to consider the impact of bundling on the set of o®ered products.
2.1 The Discriminatory E®ects of Bundling
The Case of Two Goods Most of the discriminatory bundling literature has focused on the
incentives to bundle two goods. Adams and Yellen (1976) formalize the seminal work of Stigler
(1963) and present examples where bundling is more or less pro¯table than component (unbundled)
sales. Schmalensee (1984) and Salinger (1995) extend the analysis to the case of normal and uniform
tastes. A simple example, adapted from Adams and Yellen (1976) demonstrates the discriminatory
incentives.
Insert Figure 1 Here
There are two goods (1,2) and four consumers (A-D), whose willingness-to-pay (WTP) for each
good is represented by a point in the top panel of Figure 1. The bottom three panels show the
demand for each good (if o®ered separately) and demand for the bundle of both goods implied by
these reservation values. Marginal costs are c1 = 20 for good 1 and c2 = 30 for good 2.
Unbundled sales imply optimal prices of p¤
1 = 60 and p¤
2 = 90, yielding consumers surplus (in market
1) of $30 and (combined) pro¯ts of $140. Consumers surplus and pro¯ts in each market (if any)
are labelled by CS and ¦ in the ¯gure. Under bundling, however, perfect negative correlation in
tastes for each component imply that all consumers have WTP of $100, yielding bundled pro¯ts of
$200. In this example, bundling permits the monopolist to extract all available consumers surplus.
The reduction in preference heterogeneity in the example (and associated surplus extraction) gen-
eralizes and is the primary bene¯t of bundling. It is not su±cient, however. In a more general
4setting, when bundled sales are preferred to component sales depends on three critical features of
preferences and costs. First is the extent of heterogeneity reduction possible from bundling. This
increases with the negative correlation in preferences for bundle components, a point made clear by
the example.4 Second is the level of marginal costs for components. Since bundling requires that
consumers purchase all goods, some below-cost sales of components can result (e.g. consumers A
and D in the example), reducing the gains from bundling. Below-cost sales become more likely the
higher marginal costs are relative to the mass of consumer preferences.5 Third is that bundling
requires ¯rms charge a single price. When consumer tastes for components di®er considerably (e.g.
multiply WTP for one of the example goods by 100), bundling is less attractive than component
sales as it permits fewer instruments (prices) to capture consumers' surplus.6
More than Two Goods Recent papers by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Armstrong (1999)
extend the analysis of bundling to consider multiple goods. If there is no substitutability or comple-
mentarity in demand, consumer WTP for bundles is the simple sum of the WTP for the components.
Assuming the monopolist cannot observe any individual consumer's WTP but knows the distribu-
tion of WTP in the population, he can construct the optimal product line. While it may appear to
be sub-optimal for him to o®er a bundle at a ¯xed fee, the optimal tari® can be quite complex and
di±cult to calculate, even for simple preference structures (Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Chone
(1998), Rochet and Stole (2000)).7
The consequences of bundling for the distribution of consumer WTP is signi¯cant. Bundling
aggregates (averages) consumer tastes for the bundle components, xj. When bundles are large, a
Law of Large Numbers (LLN) e®ect obtains: the distribution of preferences for the bundle becomes
more concentrated as n increases (e.g., White (1984)). The implication of this result for the bundle
demand curve is demonstrated in Figure 2, adapted from Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999). For
the case of uniformly distributed tastes (i.e. linear demand for components), the ¯gure presents
the demand curve for a bundle of size 1, 2, and 20.8 As bundle size increases, there are fewer
extreme tastes, corresponding to an increasingly °at demand curve and greater consumer surplus
4Negative correlation, however, is not necessary for bundling to be pro¯table (McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston
(1989)).
5Evans and Salinger (2005) further discuss cost-based arguments for bundling.
6McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) extend the analysis of Adams and Yellen (1976) to consider mixed
bundling, the o®ering of both component and bundled sales, and show it always yields (weakly) greater pro¯ts than
pure bundling. The reason for this is clear: it maintains the bene¯ts of bundling (if any) and strictly increases the
number of prices available to capture surplus. Despite this fact, mixed bundling is relatively uncommon, perhaps due
to the added administrative costs associated with o®ering both bundled and component goods.
7Armstrong (1999) shows that the proportion of ¯rst-best pro¯ts obtainable by bundling is given by
¼¤





n ). This implies for a bundle of a size common in the cable television industry (e.g. between 30 and 60),
a simple ¯xed fee tari® yields pro¯ts of at least 77%-81% of the ¯rst-best pro¯t.
8Similar e®ects obtain for other distributions.
5extraction.9 Figure 1 exhibited a similar e®ect for just 2 goods.
Insert Figure 2 Here
Does the monopolist bene¯t from this reduction in heterogeneity? As in the two-good case, it
does when costs are low (discouraging below-cost sales of components) and when tastes aren't too
extreme (which favors pricing components separately).
The Welfare E®ects of Discriminatory Bundling What are the implications of discrimina-
tory bundling for welfare? When costs are zero, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999, Proposition 1) ¯nd
that as bundle size increases, both consumers surplus and deadweight loss per good converge to
zero.10 As bundle size grows without bound, ¯rms extract all the surplus available in the mar-
ket. On average, consumers lose, but ¯rms gain by more than consumers lose and total surplus
increases.11
When marginal costs are positive, bundling becomes less desirable for all of consumers, ¯rms, and
society. Bundling with positive marginal costs admits the possibility of below-cost sales, reducing
gains to all parties. Indeed, as we show in the next section, it is possible for a monopolist to have the
incentive to pro¯tably introduce products that actually reduce total welfare. Regardless, positive
costs does not attenuate the central lesson of this literature: bundling can help a monopolist extract
consumers surplus and increase pro¯t.
2.2 Bundling and Product Choice
The previous section took the set of o®ered products as given. This is inappropriate if bundling
itself can increase the set of o®ered products, to the bene¯t of consumers, ¯rms, and society as a
whole. To address this issue, we therefore consider the incentives facing a monopolist to introduce
new goods on either a stand-alone or bundled basis.
Primitives Suppose a monopolist currently o®ers a single product and is considering the o®er of
an additional product either as a stand-alone (µ a la carte) product or in a bundle with his existing
9This may seem counter-intuitive. For a ¯xed level of demand (e.g. rotate a linear demand curve around its
intersection with the quantity axis), a monopolists pro¯t is higher the more inelastic is demand. Bundling, however,
simultaneously shifts out and °attens the aggregate demand curve.
10The assumptions underlying this result are three: (1) zero marginal costs, (2) independent preferences for com-
ponents, and (3) free disposal. The second of these can be relaxed as long as preferences for components aren't too
positively correlated. See Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Crawford (2006).
11Throughout this paper, we take total surplus to be the simple sum of consumers and producers surplus. Other
social welfare functions (e.g. a Rawlsian one that maximizes the minimum of the two) would yield very di®erent
conclusions.
6product.
Let p1 and p2 be the prices charged by the monopolist for each product if he o®ers the second on an µ a
la carte basis and let p1+2 be the price charged if he o®ers them as a bundle. Let w1(p1) = D1(p1)=N,
w2(p2) = D2(p2)=N, and w1+2(p1+2) = D1+2(p1+2)=N be the associated per-capita demand curves
and market shares for known market size N. Let the associated per-capita variable cost functions
be Ci(wi) = ciwi, for i = f1;2;1+2g, where ci is the marginal cost for product i. At times, we will
also allow for per-capita ¯xed costs, Fi, for o®ering each product.
Let per-capita consumer surplus, gross pro¯t (i.e. ignoring ¯xed costs), and gross total surplus for





¼i(pi) = piwi(pi) ¡ Ci(wi(pi))
= (pi ¡ ci)wi(pi)
(2)
Wi(pi) = ¼i(pi) + Si(pi) (3)
Let pM
i = argmaxpi¼i(pi) be the pro¯t-maximizing price charged by the monopolist for each product







i ). Similarly let p¤
i = argmaxpiWi(pi) be the welfare-maximizing price for
each product with associated (gross) pro¯t, consumer, and total surplus, ¼¤
i , S¤
i , and W¤
i de¯ned
analogously.
Incentives for Stand-Alone Products Assume that there is no substitutability or complemen-
tarity in demand between the two products.12 If the monopolist o®ers the potential new product
on an µ a la carte basis, his incremental pro¯t is just the pro¯t from that product, ¼M
2 .
The incentives facing the monopolist in this case can be summarized by Figure 3.
Insert Figure 3 Here
Displayed is the demand curve corresponding to an exponential distribution of willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for the potential product in the population of consumers. The mean and variance of this
12All else equal, substitutability (complementarity) will increase (decrease) the monopolist's incentives to o®er the
product.
7distribution are both equal to one. Also reported are the pro¯t-maximizing price and market share
for this demand curve under the assumption that marginal costs are $0.30.
Pro¯t-maximizing gross pro¯t, ¼M
2 , is given by the area B in the ¯gure. Welfare-maximizing
gross total surplus, W¤
2, is given by the sum of the areas A, B, and C. If there are ¯xed costs from
introducing the new product, any ¯xed cost between B and (A + B + C) will prevent the monopolist
from introducing the product on an µ a la carte basis even though it could increase social welfare. The
reason is simple: the monopolist cannot appropriate the total surplus from the introduction of the
product. It loses some to consumers surplus (A) and some to the deadweight loss from monopoly
pricing (C).
Spence (1975) introduced ¯ ´ ¼M=W¤ to measure the di®erence between private and social in-
centives to o®er a new product.13 ¯ 2 [0;1] and the larger it is, the more the monopolist can
appropriate the total potential surplus from introducing the product. For exponential tastes, the
monopolist can only capture 37% of the total surplus created by o®ering the product.
Incentives for Bundles Now consider the case where the monopolist o®ers the new product as
part of a bundle with his existing product. For simplicity, we assume consumer preferences and
marginal costs for each product are the same as in Figure 3. Figure 4 describes the consequences
of bundling on the monopolist's incentives.
Insert Figure 4 Here
Pictured in the left panel is the demand for the monopolist's existing product when WTP is
distributed as an exponential in the population of households. Pictured in the right panel is the
demand for a bundle of the two products when WTP for each is distributed as an exponential.
Bundling changes the calculus of product choice. When bundling, the monopolist compares the
incremental pro¯t of adding the good to his existing bundle (¢¼M = ¼M
1+2¡¼M
1 = B1+2¡B1) to any
¯xed costs he might incur. From an e±ciency perspective, the question is whether this change in
pro¯t is more or less than the incremental surplus from o®ering the product on an µ a la carte basis,
i.e. whether ¢¼M is closer or further to W¤
2.14 Let ¢¯ = ¢¼M=W¤
2. The ¯gure demonstrates that
bundling can help solve the product choice problem. Comparing ¯ and ¢¯, the ¯gure shows that
for the exponential distribution, adding the second product to the bundle increases the share of the
surplus the monopolist can capture from that product.
13Technically he introduced the idea to measure the di®erence between private and social incentives for selecting a
quality for a product necessarily o®ered by the monopolist, but the incentives in both cases are similar.
14An alternative e±ciency criterion would be to compare the change in pro¯t with the change in welfare from
o®ering the product in the bundle (i.e. ¢¼
¤ v. ¢W
¤). While reasonable (and the approach taken by Anderson and
Coate (2005)), this appears further from the original intent of the product choice problem.
8Bundling also changes the welfare consequences of additional products. In the µ a la carte case,
whenever a ¯rm introduces a product it necessarily increases both consumer and total welfare (cf.
Figure 3). There is no such guarantee when adding a product to a bundle. Adding a new product
can decrease consumer welfare (¢SM ´ SM
1+2¡SM
1 ), decrease total welfare (¢WM ´ WM
1+2¡WM
1 ) or
both. The reason is that bundling enhances pro¯tability by exploiting consumer preferences across
goods. It may therefore be pro¯table to add a new product to a bundle solely to increase surplus
extraction on other products, even if adding the new product decreases total welfare. Similarly,
even if some consumers bene¯t from the addition of a new product to the bundle, their gains may
be outweighed by losses to existing consumers of the bundle.
Mean Preferences, Marginal Costs, and Correlation What factors in°uence when bundling
enhances incentives to o®er new products? When it reduces welfare? As earlier, two key factors
determine the consequences of bundling on pro¯ts and welfare: the di®erence between marginal
cost and mean WTP for components and correlation in that WTP for components.15
To explore the e®ect of each of these factors, consider again a monopolist that currently o®ers a
bundle and is considering o®ering a new product, either on an µ a la carte basis or as part of his
existing bundle. Suppose for convenience he could select among a continuum of potential products
that di®er in several dimensions: the distribution, mean, and variance of WTP for the product,
the marginal and ¯xed costs the monopolist would have to pay, and the degree of correlation in
household tastes between the new product and the existing bundle.16
Figure 5 demonstrates the in°uence of the di®erence between mean WTP and marginal costs on
the pro¯t and welfare of bundling while ¯gure 6 demonstrates the in°uence of negative correlation
on the pro¯t and welfare of bundling. In each ¯gure, 4 panels are shown. The top two panels in
each ¯gure present the e±ciency consequences of bundling (i.e. \How close does bundling get to
ensuring o®erings that could increase total welfare?"). Reported are the incremental pro¯t from
bundling (¢¦M) or µ a la carte sales (¦M
2 ) as well as the total surplus available from o®ering it on an
e±cient µ a la carte (W¤
2) or bundled (¢W¤) basis.17 The bottom two panels in each ¯gure present
the actual welfare consequences of bundling (i.e. \What actually happens to consumer and total
surplus from bundling?"). Reported are the incremental total and consumers' surplus from µ a la
carte and bundled sales (WM
2 , SM
2 , ¢WM, and ¢SM). Of course, actual welfare (in the bottom
panels) is always less than potential welfare (in the top panels) due to the distortions caused by
15Schmalensee (1984) establishes the importance of these factors in a numerical analysis with two goods. Fang and
Norman (2005) con¯rm the importance of the ¯rst in general settings.
16In particular, let preferences for the bundle be distributed normally with mean WTP of 30, a standard deviation
of 8, and let marginal costs for the bundle be 9. Unless otherwise stated, let mean WTP for the potential new product
be a truncated normal with mean 1 and standard deviation 1 and let its marginal cost be 0.30. These values aren't
critical; they were chosen to facilitate identifying the in°uence of each of the factors.
17That is, the total surplus when setting price equal to marginal cost.
9monopoly pricing.
Insert Figure 5 Here
Figure 5 demonstrates the importance of marginal costs for the pro¯t and welfare of µ a la carte
versus bundled sales. When costs are zero (left-hand panels), total potential welfare from bundled
and component sales are equal (W¤
2 ¼ ¢W¤) and bundling yields greater pro¯t. For any potential
product, therefore, there are a range of ¯xed costs for which that product would be o®ered in a
bundle and not o®ered on an µ a la carte basis and total welfare would increase. Consumers, too,
would bene¯t from the o®ering. When costs are positive, however, whether bundling could be more
e±cient than µ a la carte sales depends on the level of mean WTP for the product. For low levels
of mean WTP (i.e. marginal costs higher than mean tastes), bundling is both pro¯t- and welfare-
reducing. For higher levels of mean WTP, however, bundling does better, providing greater pro¯t
(and thus stronger incentives for product introductions) when tastes are approximately 40% greater
than costs. Note also in the bottom panels that consumers' surplus from bundling is everywhere
lower than that from µ a la carte sales.
Insert Figure 6 Here
Figure 6 demonstrates the importance of negative correlation (and costs) for the pro¯tability of
bundled sales. In all the panels, the correlation between the existing bundle and the new product
is allowed to vary between -0.7 and 0.7.18 In the left-hand (right-hand) panels, mean tastes are
slightly below (above) costs. While µ a la carte pro¯t and welfare (¦M
2 , SM
2 , and WM
2 ) are invariant to
correlation, the pro¯t and welfare consequences of bundling (¢¦M, ¢SM, and ¢WM) are highly
dependent on it. For large negative correlation and costs high relative to tastes (the left-hand
panels), consumer and total surplus can actually fall with the bundling of new goods. This cannot
happen under µ a la carte sales. The right-hand panel demonstrates the importance of high marginal
costs to this conclusion. It duplicates the left-hand panel after cutting marginal costs in half. While
pro¯tability is still strongly decreasing in correlation, bundling never reduces welfare. It is therefore
the interaction of high costs and negative correlation that can yield bundling that reduces total
welfare.
18This is a high but not unreasonable level of correlation. It is possible to generate correlations of this order if one
could identify a potential product that appealed (exclusively) to the bottom 10-11% of the population of tastes for
the existing bundle.
103 Bundling, Product Choice, and Welfare in Cable Television
Markets
The previous section demonstrated that bundling generally transfers surplus from consumers to
¯rms, but can also encourage the introduction of products that would not otherwise be o®ered.
This section applies these ideas to the cable television industry. Cable television systems choose a
portfolio of television networks, bundle them into services, and o®er these services to consumers in
local, geographically separate, cable markets. The three main types of program networks o®ered
on cable are broadcast networks, cable networks, and premium networks.19 Broadcast and cable
networks are typically bundled and o®ered as Basic and Expanded Basic Services while premium
programming networks are typically unbundled and sold as Premium Services.
The bundling of cable networks into Basic and Expanded Basic services have recently come under
scrutiny by both law- and policy-makers. Frustrated by ever-increasing prices, consumers and their
representatives in the federal government have asked if unbundled sales might not be a potential
solution. If consumers select just those channels that they prefer, might not cable bills fall? Cable
systems and the television networks o®ered on them have been vocal in their opposition. They
argue that µ a la carte sales would (i) increase costs, (ii) decrease advertising revenues, and (iii)
reduce the viability of (especially small, niche) networks.
To address these questions, we calibrate the model above to an \average" system in the cable
television industry and simulate the e®ects of two µ a la carte proposals considered in the popular
press. In so doing, we analyze the pricing and bundling for this system's most popular Expanded
Basic service. A recent survey of cable television systems conducted by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) found that the average U.S. cable system charged $45.32, had a market
share of 72%, and o®ered 45 Expanded Basic channels (FCC (2005a), FCC (2005b)). Surveying
the population of cable systems from Warren (2005), we selected California Cable of Monterey,
California as our sample system.20 This system's most popular Expanded Basic service o®ered 50
cable networks, charged a price of $44.05, and had a market share of 74%.
We call our two µ a la carte scenarios \Full µ A La Carte" and \Theme Tiers". In both proposals we
assume that before households can purchase any networks on an µ a la carte basis, they must ¯rst
purchase a \Limited Basic" bundle consisting of all available broadcast and public interest channels
o®ered in Monterey. For analytical convenience, we assume that all households value this bundle at
$5 and that California Cable of Monterey therefore charges a price of $5 for it.21 In the \Full µ A La
19Examples of each type are ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX for broadcast networks, MTV, CNN, and ESPN for cable
programming networks, and HBO and Showtime for premium networks.
20California Cable is owned by Comcast, the largest Multiple System Operator (MSO) in the United States.
21Modelling household preferences for broadcast networks is more challenging that for cable networks as cable
systems do not generally receive payment for them. Instead, the owners of television networks generally negotiate
11Carte" scenario, we assume that California Cable of Monterey o®ers every current cable network
in the most popular Expanded Basic bundle on an µ a la carte basis instead. In the \Theme Tier"
scenario, we assume that they instead bundle networks with similar subject matter into 11 tiers
and o®er these tiers on an µ a la carte basis. In both scenarios, we assume the bundle is no longer
o®ered.22 The allocation of networks into the theme tiers is described in Table 2.
Assumptions Before beginning, it is worth mentioning six important assumptions implicit in this
analysis. First, as described above, we are not considering the impact to the potential network's
advertising revenues of being o®ered µ a la carte instead of in a bundle. Many industry participants
have argued viewership and advertising revenue will be (possibly substantially) lower under µ a la
carte (Booz Allen Hamilton (2004), Mandel (2004)).23 Second, we assume that marginal costs to
cable systems are positive. This re°ects institutional reality: cable networks charge \a±liate fees"
(in units of dollars per subscriber per month) to cable systems for the right to carry that network
on a given cable system.24 Third, in the simulations to follow, we must make assumptions about
the marginal costs systems would pay in an µ a la carte world. For our \Full µ A La Carte" scenario, we
assume the cable system and programming network share equally in the revenues from µ a la carte.25
For our \Theme Tiers" scenario, we assume marginal costs to systems are the same as they are
under the bundle. As these marginal costs are important determinants of outcomes and welfare
under µ a la carte, we discuss the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions on costs after
presenting the baseline results. Fourth, we assume that there are no ¯xed costs to the cable system
associated with o®ering an additional channel on either an µ a la carte or bundled basis.26 Fifth, we
carriage agreements for their a±liated cable networks. Furthermore, modelling the demand for and pricing of µ a la
carte networks in the presence of heterogeneous tastes for the \Limited Basic" bundle is much more complicated. See
Crawford and Yurukoglu (2007) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
22 Economic theory has strong predictions about such \mixed bundling": it further increases ¯rm pro¯tability and
reduces consumer welfare (McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989)).
23The two primary sources of viewer loss often articulated under µ a la carte are the unwillingness of some households
to purchase a network that they view infrequently and the inability of households to sample new programming, a
typical pre-cursor to frequent viewing.
24One may argue that the appropriate marginal cost for welfare purposes is zero as that better re°ects the economic
cost to society of distributing television networks by satellite. Even so, bundling can still be ine±cient: there can be
values of ¯xed costs exceeding the gross total surplus created by a potential new product for which it is still pro¯table
for the monopolist to o®er it. As for my earlier results, this is more likely the more negatively correlated are tastes
for networks.
25While contracts between networks and cable systems are sensitive competitive information, industry sources
con¯rm this is a typical revenue sharing arrangement in these contracts (when included).
26On institutional grounds, substantial ¯xed costs to systems are unlikely. For the average cable system, adding
a network requires negotiating a carriage agreement with the network and including it in the programming lineup
of the system. The only potential cost of any consequence would arise if a cable system didn't have the technical
capability of o®ering µ a la carte networks in a low-cost way. Since most cable systems now control access to µ a la
carte (e.g. Premium) networks using addressable converters, the \set-top boxes" that decompress and unscramble
television signals before passing them to the television, adding a network merely requires re-programming a system's
converters and is e®ectively costless. There could be costs to households, however, if they previously did not use
an addressable converter. Furthermore, without addressable converters, there could be substantial incremental ¯xed
12assume that the cable system maximizes short-run economic pro¯ts.27
The ¯nal assumption relates to competition. The model in this paper is that of a monopoly cable
provider. A typical U.S. cable system, however, competes with two satellite providers and faces
the prospect of further competition from local telephone companies, internet delivery of television
programming, and other distribution technologies.
There are three potential impacts of competition on our analysis. The ¯rst relates to the poten-
tial impact of satellite competition on recovering preferences for bundles. We will momentarily
be recovering an estimate of the distribution of household WTP for Expanded Basic service in
Monterey based on an assumption that the system there is a monopolist. But is it? In a way, it
is: satellite systems select their programming and prices on a national basis, not in response to
the products and prices o®ered (just) in Monterey. In any local cable market, national satellite
pricing implies the local cable system is best modelled as a monopolist on the residual demand
de¯ned by the aggregate demand for multi-channel video programming less those households that
purchase satellite service.28 The assumption in this paper is that households in Monterey purchase
either satellite or cable based on factors uncorrelated with the WTP for the programming o®ered
by California Cable of Monterey.29 We then measure the distribution for WTP for networks and
bundles of those networks for the cable households.
A second issue relates to the impact of competition when networks are o®ered µ a la carte. If all
distributors carry all networks, there is little to di®erentiate a network o®ered on cable versus
satellite. Competition is therefore likely to be stronger with µ a la carte sales.30 What impact would
this have on our welfare comparisons of µ a la carte and bundled sales? If stronger competition
reduced prices for individual networks under µ a la carte, the result would be increased consumer
welfare for those networks that continued to be viable. The analysis in the previous section suggests,
costs of o®ering µ a la carte networks.
27Television content is now becoming available over the Internet (both legally and illegally), introducing the pos-
sibility of disintermediation of cable systems over time. Furthermore, early indications are that this content is likely
to be available on an µ a la carte (indeed individual program) basis. If cable operators are able to e®ectively maintain
copyright protection (a big \if"), our view is that this represents a form of \mixed bundling" that simply further
increases ¯rm pro¯tability (cf. footnote 22). That being said, there could be long-run consequences of bundling by
cable systems: it may encourage consumers to seek alternative sources of distribution.
28Chu (2006) makes a similar assumption.
29We will go wrong if satellite consumers are disproportionately selected from some portion of the distribution
of WTP for multi-channel video programming. In practice, this could go either way - at least one of the two U.S.
satellite providers (DirecTV) o®ers a broader range of programming, including exclusive sports programming, while
the other (Dish Network) o®ers programming comparable (if not better) than most local cable systems at a lower
price.
30Bundling likely softens competition by di®erentiating providers, particularly after accounting for non-
programming services provided by some distributors (e.g. high-speed internet and telephone service by some cable
systems). Even if an µ a la carte regime required the purchase of a minimal bundle from a distributor and there are
moderate costs to switching distributors, a network o®ered on an µ a la carte basis is likely to be less di®erentiated
than if it were bundled.
13however, that fewer networks would be viable, making the aggregate welfare e®ects unclear.31
While not the intent, the consequence of these assumptions is to provide a fairly favorable scenario
for µ a la carte pricing. From a policy perspective, this scenario is useful for two reasons. First,
it identi¯es whether µ a la carte could possibly improve welfare. Second, it identi¯es the areas of
uncertainty that must be resolved before µ a la carte could be considered a viable policy option.
While addressing the advertising market and competition in distribution is beyond the scope of
this paper, we can address the consequence of our assumptions on costs to our conclusions. We do
so after presenting the baseline results.
3.1 The Baseline Results
Our policy simulations are done in two stages. In the ¯rst stage, we recover the distribution of house-
hold WTP for bundles and marginal costs consistent with observed market outcomes (prices and
market shares) in Monterey. Given that distribution, we then calculate baseline welfare measures
(consumer surplus, (gross) producer surplus, and (gross) total surplus) implied by these preferences
and costs. In the second stage, we calculate market outcomes and welfare measures under \Full µ A
La Carte" and \Theme Tiers", two policy proposals that have been discussed in the popular press.
The functional form and distributional assumptions underlying each stage are introduced in turn.
The First Stage: WTP for Bundles and Baseline Welfare The most popular Expanded
Basic is available to consumers in Monterey at a price of $44.05 with 72% of households subscribing.
What then must be the distribution of WTP for this service? What are California Cable of
Monterey's marginal costs? To solve for these objects, we make two assumptions. First, we assume
the WTP for bundles of networks are distributed normally with mean ¹B and variance ¾2
B. In
practice, this is a weak assumption: the distribution of WTP for individual networks could be
almost anything and the resulting WTP for bundles of those networks would be normal.32 Second,
we assume that marginal costs in Monterey are 28% of the price.33 Under these assumptions (and
after taking out $5 for the Limited Basic bundle), we ¯nd WTP for Expanded Basic service in
Monterey is normally distributed with mean $47.00 and variance $151.29.
Given this result, we can then calculate the welfare e®ects of the existing bundle. These are given
31The product choice literature emphasizes that competitive markets may provide too many products and there is
some evidence of this in radio markets (Berry and Waldfogel (1999)). This is unlikely to be true for cable networks,
however, as competing distributors share in covering the ¯xed costs of programming networks rather than duplicating
them.
32The reason: Central Limit Theorems (CLTs). In statistics, CLTs show that the distribution of a sum of random
variables tends to be normally distributed as long as the individual components aren't too positively correlated. See
Crawford (2006) for a deeper discussion of this issue applied to bundles of cable networks.
33This is consistent with industry sources (Halfon (2003, footnote 78), FCC (2003)).
14in the ¯rst column of Table 1. As can be seen there, although we come close to matching the
observed price and market share for Expanded Basic cable service in Monterey, we don't match
them exactly.34 For our predicted outcomes, the average cable subscriber receives a surplus of
$13.72 and California Cable earns average gross pro¯ts of $27.14 for a gross total surplus of $40.86.
Similar values for the average Monterey household, cable subscriber or not, are $10.37, $20.52, and
$30.89.35
The Second Stage: Preferences for Networks and µ A La Carte Welfare To simulate
market outcomes and welfare in an µ a la carte world, we must again make assumptions about the
distribution of WTP and marginal costs, this time for each network o®ered in Monterey. We
acknowledge up front that there are many possible assumptions one could make that would yield
identical values for ¹B and ¾2
B that we recovered in the ¯rst stage. We've tried to base our
assumptions on institutional patterns known in the industry; estimating these directly from data
is the topic of related work in progress (Crawford and Yurukoglu (2007)).
We assume preferences for each network have a very particular form. For each network, j, in
Monterey, we assume that only a portion of households, °j, have positive WTP for that network;
the remaining proportion, 1 ¡ °j, value it at zero.36 We further assume that among those that
have positive WTP, tastes for each network j are distributed independently of other networks as
a log-normal with location parameter ¹j and (common) shape parameter, ¾2.37 We consider the
impact of correlation in tastes for networks after presenting the baseline results.
What of costs? Kagan World Media (2007) reports average a±liate fees for most of the networks
o®ered by California Cable in Monterey.38 Based on the assumption that marginal costs are 28% of
the Expanded Basic price in Monterey (net the $5 for Limited Basic), this implies California Cable
gets a 8.9% discount relative to these national averages.39 Applied to each network this implies its
marginal cost = cj = 91:1% ¤ Kaganj. Table 2 reports the average Kagan costs.
What of marginal costs in an µ a la carte world? There are both institutional and theoretical reasons
34For internal consistency, all the counterfactual policy comparisons presented in the paper use our predicted values
as the baseline.
35Per-household measures prove useful later for comparisons with the µ a la carte scenarios.
36In our simulations, we assume that °j equals 2.5 times the weekly cumulative viewing of each network from a
given week in 2004. See Figure 7 taken from Mandel (2004).
37The mean and variance of a log-normal with these parameters is EXj = e





38 Networks o®ered that did not have a±liate fee data were Headline News, Telemundo, California Channel,
KMWB, and the shopping networks (Home Shopping Network, QVC, and ShopNBC). We assumed a low WTP
for shopping networks given that the networks generate most of their revenue from advertising and probably are
provided to systems at low or zero cost. For the remaining, we assigned to them the median cost of a cable network.
If anything, this likely overstates their actual costs.
39This is not surprising. Comcast (the owner of California Cable) is the largest operate of cable systems in the
U.S. and is known to be an aggressive negotiator with program networks.
15to believe television networks would negotiate higher prices from cable systems if they are o®ered
on an µ a la carte basis.40 Furthermore, marketing, operating, and equipment costs could rise under
µ a la carte sales.41 As described earlier, we assume that systems share revenue in the \Full µ A La
Carte" scenario and that marginal costs do not change in the \Theme Tier" scenario.
Under these assumptions, there are two sets of free parameters, the network-speci¯c means of
WTP, ¹j, and the scale parameter, ¾2. To pin down ¹j, we assume mean tastes for each network
is a constant multiple of the (estimated) a±liate fee charged to California Cable in Monterey, i.e.
¹j = ¸cj. This provides enough structure to recover the distribution of tastes for each network:
simply solve for the ¸ and ¾2 such that the sum of the distributions of WTP for the individual
networks equals a normal distribution with mean ¹B and variance ¾2
B. Doing so yielded ^ ¸ = 4:3
and ^ ¾2 = 0:23:
Scenario 1: Full µ A La Carte We ¯rst consider our results from full µ a la carte pricing. Prices for
channels ranged from a high of $9.34 for ESPN to a low of $0.22 for GalaVision (a Spanish-language
network), with an average price per network of $1.47 and an average market share of 34.1%.42 Table
3 lists market outcomes and estimated per-household welfare for each of the channels o®ered in
Monterey. If a consumers were to buy all the channels previously o®ered in the bundle, the total
price would be $78.54 (including the $5 for \Limited Basic"), slightly less than double the bundled
price.
What are the welfare consequences of full µ a la carte? We answer this question in two parts. We
¯rst answer assuming that each of the networks o®ered in Monterey continues to be o®ered. Under
this assumption, the second column of Table 1 shows that consumers are (much) better o® and
¯rms are (much) worse o®, at a moderate cost to society. Average per-household consumers surplus
under µ a la carte is $17.17 (a 65.6% increase), gross ¯rm pro¯t is $11.44 (a 44.2% decrease), and
gross total surplus is $28.61 (a 7.4% decrease). If our assumptions are accurate, it is no wonder
¯rms are adamantly opposed to µ a la carte.
In Section 2.2, we demonstrated, however, that because bundling is more pro¯table than µ a la carte
sales, some channels may no longer be viable under µ a la carte. Similarly, there may be ¯xed costs
to cable systems that exceed their pro¯t from a network o®ered on an µ a la carte basis. We address
40Kagan Media Research (2005) \estimates TV channel operators would need to raise per-capita channel carriage
fees by a multiple of four to o®set a 50% loss of subscribers from big basic bundles". This general pattern of higher
a±liate fees for µ a la carte networks is an equilibrium outcome of a model by Rennho® and Serfes (2005).
41For example, marketing costs for (µ a la carte) Premium cable networks are in the range of 15-25% of sales, while
those for (bundled) Expanded Basic cable networks are 2-6% of sales (Booz Allen Hamilton (2004, Figure 16)).
Similarly, bundling (or alternatives like subscriber-selected tiers) are much less complex, saving on costs (Chu, Leslie,
and Sorensen (2006), Wildman (2006)).
42These calculations and those for Theme Tiers subtract o® the $5.00 for Limited Basic when calculating the
average price per network or price per tier.
16this issue in two ways. First, we calculate the pro¯t of each network from µ a la carte sales versus
the incremental pro¯t that adding the network would bring to a bundle containing all of the other
networks o®ered in Monterey. As expected, incremental per-household bundling pro¯ts are on
average $12.31 higher (107.4% of per-household µ a la carte pro¯ts), suggesting that there could be
values of ¯xed costs such that networks would be o®ered under bundling but not under µ a la carte
sales. Could these losses outweigh the aggregate consumer surplus gains from µ a la carte? To address
this question, we rank networks by their µ a la carte pro¯t and calculate how many would have to
exit from the market in order for µ a la carte to yield surplus to the average consumer no higher than
they get from purchasing the bundle. The results are quite stark. Fully 41 of the 50 o®ered cable
networks would have to exit for consumers surplus under full µ a la carte to be no higher than in a
bundled world.43 While some networks would surely exit, it seems unlikely that so many would,
suggesting consumer welfare would likely be higher under "Full µ A La Carte" than bundled sales.
Scenario 2: Theme Tiers What of theme tiers? Our results show that these provide interme-
diate bene¯ts. Assuming marginal costs are the same here as under the full bundle, prices ranged
from a high of $16.28 for the Sports Tier (containing ESPN, ESPN2, Fox Sports Net, the Golf
Channel, and the Outdoor Life Network) to a low of $0.38 for the Shopping Tier (containing QVC,
ShopNBC, and the Home Shopping Network 2). The average price per tier (network) is $4.11
($0.90) and the average (tier) market share is 44.1%. Table 4 lists market outcomes for each of the
theme tiers. If a consumers were to buy all the channels previously o®ered in the bundle, the total
price would be $50.22 (including the $5 for \Limited Basic"), only slightly more than the bundled
price.
What are the welfare consequences in this case? Assuming each of the networks o®ered in Monterey
continues to be o®ered, the third column of Table 1 shows that consumers are now moderately better
o® and ¯rms are moderately worse o®. Average per-household consumers surplus under theme tiers
is $11.84 (a 14.2% increase), gross ¯rm pro¯t is $17.29 (a 15.7% decrease), and gross total surplus is
$29.13 (a 5.7% decrease). As before, consumers bene¯t by less than ¯rms lose, yielding a decrease
in total surplus.
As for full µ a la carte, adding networks to the full bundle produces more pro¯t than adding them
to theme tiers (by $6.48 or 37.5% of theme tier pro¯ts). Again ranking networks by their µ a la
carte pro¯t now shows 24 of the 50 o®ered cable networks would have to exit for consumers surplus
under theme tiers to be no higher than in a bundled world.44 Here, too, it seems unlikely so many
networks would no longer be viable, suggesting consumer welfare would still be higher under theme
43The last four networks that would have to be dropped are estimated to be AMC, The Discovery Channel, CNBC,
and MTV.
44The last four networks that would have to be dropped to equate welfare in this case are estimated to be Court
TV, Outdoor Life Network, VH1, and Bravo.
17tiers than the full bundle.
3.2 Robustness
In this subsection we consider the robustness of our results to several of our assumptions.
Marginal Costs Our assumptions on marginal costs are both qualitatively and quantitatively
important to our results. If, for example, marginal costs to cable systems were to increase by a
factor of three when all networks are o®ered µ a la carte, both consumers surplus and the monopolist's
pro¯t would fall, decreasing total surplus by almost a third!
How likely is this scenario? Probably not very. Among all the assumptions on costs we've tried,
50% revenue sharing yielded the greatest aggregate gross pro¯t to cable networks and cable systems
next to the bundle. While detailed conclusions therefore depend on the likely form of contracts
between network providers and cable systems in any µ a la carte scenario, some hybrid of low marginal
costs and some bundling (like our Theme Tiers) or high marginal costs/revenue sharing (like our
Full µ A La Carte) seems likely.
Correlation In Section 2, we emphasized how important correlation can be for the pro¯t and
welfare consequences of bundling. In our baseline results, however, we assume independence in
tastes for networks. In part, this is of necessity: there are over 1,200 correlations between pairs
of 50 networks and there are no empirical results to guide the choice of their values (or even their
signs in some cases). As a very crude robustness test, we re-estimated our model assigning what
we felt were plausible values for correlations both within and between the networks according to
their allocation to our theme tiers and the results were nearly identical to the baseline speci¯cation
presented above.
Does that mean correlation is unimportant? No. As noted in Section 2, bundling pro¯tability
is increasing in the negative correlation between a new product and an existing bundle, giving a
monopolist strong incentives to carry such networks. This increased pro¯tability also gives the
monopolist incentives not to carry networks that are similar to other networks already included in
the bundle (i.e. those for which correlation is likely to be positive). This factor has, if anything,
the opposite e®ect for µ a la carte sales; carrying a competing network could enhance a cable sys-
tem's bargaining power with incumbent networks. Bundling is therefore likely to bias cable systems
against carrying networks that compete with established incumbent networks. Indeed, this conjec-
ture can possibly explain consumers increased frustration about having to pay large annual price
increases for cable bundles when the incremental additions to the bundle are highly-specialized
niche networks (Squeo and Flint (2004)). If such networks help attract new subscribers but provide
18little value to existing subscribers, they are likely to be negatively correlated with tastes for the
existing bundle. If marginal costs to cable systems for these networks are also above mean tastes
{ a possibility if only a small portion of the population values the new networks { the addition
of these networks may be pro¯table but welfare-reducing.45 Evaluating correlation in household
tastes for networks are therefore an important area of future research.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we conduct a numerical analysis of bundling's impact on a monopolist's pricing and
product choice and assess the implications for consumer welfare in cable television markets. Since
theoretical models are ambiguous about the net impact of bundling on welfare, we take a numerical
approach. We calibrate a model of the pricing decisions of an average monopoly cable system and
assess the implications of the model for consumer welfare in cable television markets.
We have three main ¯ndings. First, because bundling aggregates household tastes for bundle
components (here cable networks), it can increase ¯rm pro¯ts and reduce consumer surplus when
marginal costs are low relative to mean tastes and when preferences aren't too heterogeneous.
Both of these outcomes are likely to be true in cable markets. Second, across a wide range of
speci¯cations, we ¯nd that bundling increases the pro¯ts of cable systems relative to µ a la carte sales,
providing stronger incentives for cable systems to o®er networks. Finally, and most important, our
simulation results suggest the ¯rst e®ect is stronger than the second. In particular, in a "Full µ A
La Carte" world, if all networks continue to be o®ered, average per-household consumers surplus
is estimated to increase by $6.80 (a 65.6% increase), gross ¯rm pro¯t is estimated to fall by $9.08
(a 44.2% decrease), and gross total surplus is estimated to fall by $2.28 (a 7.4% decrease). These
e®ects almost surely outweigh any compensating bene¯t of µ a la carte to enhance incentives to o®er
networks; we estimate that 41 of the 50 o®ered cable networks in Monterey would have to exit
for consumers surplus under Full µ A La Carte to be no higher than that under bundling. Theme
tiers o®er similar, though smaller, e®ects (a 14.2% increase in consumers surplus, a 15.7% decrease
in pro¯t, a 5.7% decrease in total surplus, and 24 networks needed to exit to equate consumer
bene¯ts). On balance, we ¯nd that consumers might well bene¯t from µ a la carte sales of cable
networks.
These conclusions come with important caveats. They depend critically on the nature of ¯xed and
marginal costs to cable systems in an µ a la carte world, conditions we speculate on but cannot know.
Furthermore, we don't directly model the consequences of competition between cable and satellite
systems, nor the impact to the advertising market of µ a la carte o®erings. The latter in particular
45Even without correlation, we estimate the incremental consumers surplus from bundling to be positive for only
7 of Monterey's 50 networks and the incremental total surplus to be positive for only 28.
19could tip the scales in favor of bundling. Even more important, however, is that we have shown that
many things can happen under bundling. To know what will happen requires better information,
particularly about consumer preferences for individual television networks, cable systems' costs
under both µ a la carte and bundled sales, and the link between household and advertising markets.
These are all fruitful topics for further research.
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23Table 1: Market Outcomes and Welfare:
Baseline Bundle and Two µ A La Carte Scenarios
Baseline: Scenario 1: Scenario 2:
Bundle Full µ A La Carte Theme Tiers
Market Outcomes
Total Price $43.06 $78.54 $50.22
Avg. Cable Network Price $0.86 $1.47 $0.90
Avg. Market Share 75.6% 34.1% 44.1%
Welfare (All Networks Viable)
Per-Household
Consumer $10.37 $17.17 $11.84
Producer $20.52 $11.44 $17.29
Total $30.89 $28.61 $29.13
Welfare (Considering Network Exit)
Di®erence in Pro¯t Adding
Network to the Bundle | $12.31 $6.48
Versus Scenario
Network Exit Required
To Equate Consumer Surplus | 41 24
Between Bundle and Scenario
24Table 2: Theme Tiers and Networks Costs
National Avg.
Tier Network Name Network Cost
ESPN $2.28
ESPN 2 $0.21
Sports Golf Channel $0.20
Outdoor Life Network $0.11
Fox Sports Net $1.34
Nickelodeon $0.38
ABC Family Channel $0.21
Family Cartoon Network $0.14
Disney Channel $0.76
Hallmark Channel $0.03
Turner Network TV $0.82
USA Cable $0.44
Lifetime $0.20
General Spike TV $0.17







News and Headline News $0.09*




Movie Arts & Entertainment $0.20
American Movie Classics $0.22
MTV $0.26
Music and VH1 $0.12
Entertainment BET $0.13
Bravo $0.13
Country Music TV $0.04
Spanish GalaVision $0.03
Telemundo $0.09*
Home Shopping Network 2 $0.01*
Shopping QVC $0.01*
ShopNBC $0.01*
Science and Discovery Channel $0.24





E! Entertainment Television $0.19
Food Network $0.06
Court TV $0.10
TV Guide Channel $0.03
Other California Channel $0.09*
KMWB (WBN) Minneapolis-St. Paul $0.09*
Notes: Reported are the allocation of cable networks into theme tiers for use in the "Theme Tier" scenario (cf. Table
1) and the national average per-subscriber cost for that network from Kagan World Media (2007). Costs for starred
networks are estimated; see footnote 38 for details.
25Table 3: Full µ A La Carte Simulation Results
Market Per Household Surplus
Price Share Consumer Producer Total Cost
Discovery Channel $0.87 53% $0.34 $0.23 $0.57 $0.43
ESPN $9.34 47% $3.24 $2.17 $5.41 $4.67
Turner Network TV $2.27 69% $1.17 $0.78 $1.95 $1.13
USA Cable $1.27 66% $0.62 $0.42 $1.04 $0.64
Arts & Entertainment $0.78 49% $0.29 $0.19 $0.48 $0.39
CNN $2.12 39% $0.62 $0.41 $1.03 $1.06
Lifetime $0.77 50% $0.29 $0.19 $0.48 $0.38
Nickelodeon $1.23 59% $0.55 $0.36 $0.91 $0.61
Spike TV $0.71 46% $0.24 $0.16 $0.41 $0.35
TBS Superstation $0.93 69% $0.48 $0.32 $0.81 $0.47
Weather Channel $0.42 41% $0.13 $0.09 $0.22 $0.21
ABC Family Channel $0.93 43% $0.30 $0.20 $0.50 $0.47
CNBC $3.07 15% $0.36 $0.24 $0.60 $1.54
ESPN 2 $1.09 37% $0.30 $0.20 $0.50 $0.54
Headline News $0.70 24% $0.13 $0.09 $0.21 $0.35
History Channel $0.74 44% $0.24 $0.16 $0.41 $0.37
Learning Channel $0.63 46% $0.21 $0.14 $0.36 $0.31
MTV $1.04 48% $0.37 $0.25 $0.62 $0.52
VH1 $0.53 43% $0.17 $0.11 $0.28 $0.26
American Movie Classics $0.93 45% $0.32 $0.21 $0.53 $0.47
Cartoon Network $0.64 42% $0.20 $0.13 $0.33 $0.32
Comedy Central $0.45 42% $0.14 $0.10 $0.23 $0.23
Fox News Channel $1.24 34% $0.31 $0.21 $0.52 $0.62
HGTV $0.34 34% $0.09 $0.06 $0.14 $0.17
Animal Planet $0.38 35% $0.10 $0.07 $0.17 $0.19
E! Entertainment Television $0.79 46% $0.27 $0.18 $0.45 $0.39
Disney Channel $3.06 47% $1.09 $0.73 $1.81 $1.53
Food Network $0.36 32% $0.09 $0.06 $0.14 $0.18
FX $1.24 49% $0.46 $0.30 $0.76 $0.62
TV Land $0.47 32% $0.11 $0.08 $0.19 $0.23
MSNBC $0.99 27% $0.20 $0.13 $0.33 $0.50
Court TV $0.69 28% $0.14 $0.10 $0.24 $0.34
BET $1.10 23% $0.19 $0.12 $0.31 $0.55
Bravo $0.83 30% $0.19 $0.12 $0.31 $0.41
Country Music TV $0.37 21% $0.06 $0.04 $0.10 $0.19
TV Guide Channel $0.23 25% $0.04 $0.03 $0.07 $0.11
Golf Channel $7.72 5% $0.28 $0.19 $0.47 $3.86
Hallmark Channel $0.30 19% $0.04 $0.03 $0.07 $0.15
Outdoor Life Network $2.21 9% $0.15 $0.10 $0.26 $1.10
oh! Oxygen $0.54 18% $0.07 $0.05 $0.12 $0.27
C-SPAN $5.18 2% $0.07 $0.05 $0.12 $2.59
C-SPAN 2 $5.44 2% $0.07 $0.05 $0.12 $2.72
California Channel $0.64 27% $0.13 $0.09 $0.22 $0.32
Fox Sports Net $5.44 47% $1.95 $1.28 $3.23 $2.72
GalaVision $0.22 27% $0.04 $0.03 $0.07 $0.11
Home Shopping Network 2 $0.35 5% $0.01 $0.01 $0.02 $0.18
KMWB $0.64 27% $0.13 $0.09 $0.21 $0.32
QVC $0.35 5% $0.01 $0.01 $0.02 $0.18
ShopNBC $0.36 5% $0.01 $0.01 $0.02 $0.18
Telemundo $0.64 27% $0.13 $0.09 $0.22 $0.32
26Table 4: Theme Tier Simulation Results
Market Per Household Surplus
Price Share Consumer Producer Total Cost
Family $5.65 51% $1.43 $2.16 $3.59 $1.38
General Interest $7.62 75% $2.19 $4.07 $6.26 $2.21
Movie $1.72 44% $0.42 $0.58 $1.00 $0.38
Music & Entertainment $2.55 48% $0.68 $0.93 $1.61 $0.62
News & Public A®airs $5.10 43% $1.47 $1.66 $3.13 $1.20
Other $1.03 34% $0.23 $0.29 $0.52 $0.19
Science & Nature $1.71 50% $0.45 $0.65 $1.10 $0.42
Shopping $0.38 14% $0.04 $0.05 $0.09 $0.03
Spanish $0.77 26% $0.13 $0.17 $0.30 $0.11
Specialty $2.42 54% $0.64 $0.98 $1.62 $0.62
Sports $16.28 46% $4.15 $5.76 $9.91 $3.77
27Figure 1: An Example of the Discriminatory Incentives to Bundle
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Source: Adapted from Adams and Yellen (1976).


























































Source: Adapted from Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999).
29Figure 3: The Incentives to O®er Stand-Alone Products




























30Figure 4: The Incentives to O®er Products in a Bundle
















































M  = $2.08
∆ π
M = 0.30









31Figure 5: The Importance of Marginal Costs relative to Mean Preferences on µ A-La-Carte v.
Bundling Outcomes



















































































































































































33Figure 7: Weekly Cume for Cable Networks
Source: Mandel (2004)
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